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ABSTRACT
This paper brings together the world of insider threats and
auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for
high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for
selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine
supported modelling and verification techniques is meaning-
ful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to secu-
rity and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions
and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and
analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the in-
teractive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use
the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combi-
nation of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy
goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Formal analysis and verification techniques applying in-
teractive theorem proving have been successfully used for
the analysis of auctions [3], as well as for security protocols
[23]. Moreover, these techniques have also been used for
insider threat analysis [12].
In this paper, we approach insider threats on auctions
formally building on the experiences from those earlier ap-
proaches in order to arrive at a meaningful framework for
a rigorous mathematical analysis of auction insider threats
using automated reasoning.
As a running example, we use a fictitious cocaine auction
protocol introduced by Stajano and Anderson [25] as a sim-
plified example to first scrutinize privacy issues in the, then
upcoming, eBay auction system and to argue the case for
physical broadcast to realize anonymity. Following the in-
ductive approach by Paulson to model and analyze security
protocols [23], we formalize the protocol exhibiting insider
threats: we first show that the formal definition in the in-
ductive approach suffices to exclude the “sweetheart deal”.
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In a sweetheart deal, the seller and one of his friends agree
before the auction that the seller sells the good at the price
determined in the auction. The participants in the auction
assume that they have a fair chance of winning the good,
but actually they have not, since the seller and his friend
have already agreed on a deal, using the participants of the
auction for determining the price. To arrive at formalizing a
collusion between bidders (“ringing”) we need to extend the
model slightly and tap into some of the concepts used in the
Isabelle insider framework [12].
The technical contributions of this paper are (a) a for-
malization of the cocaine protocol using Isabelle’s inductive
approach including the formalization and proof of the ab-
sence of the sweetheart deal and the impossibility of ex-
cluding collusion of insiders (b) the extension of the induc-
tive approach to auctions by expressing arbitrary numbers
of rounds, broadcast messages, an anonymity layer, and by
merging with the Isabelle insider framework. The technical
contributions lead to a deeper understanding of the relation-
ship between auctions and security protocols with regard to
insider threats paving the way for a more substantial Isabelle
insider framework integrating relevant parts of the inductive
approach to model and verify auction systems in the pres-
ence of insider threats.
We first review the auction literature with a special regard
to security attacks involving collusions. Vice versa we sum-
marize how the insider threat community deals with collu-
sion of insiders (Section 2). Section 3 introduces our running
example, the cocaine auction protocol, before we present its
formalization in the Isabelle inductive approach (Section 4).
We finally discuss to what extent the formal approach is use-
ful to express possible insider threats to auctions, whether
the threats exhibited on the case study are representative
and complete, and summarize challenges for future research
on this (Section 6).
2. AUCTION ATTACKS AND COLLUDING
INSIDERS
In this section, we want first to give a very brief introduc-
tion to auctions and then discuss one of the biggest problem
of auctions, collusion.
Auctions come in different forms, for instance, there are
so-called first price and second price auctions. In first price
auctions, the winner is the bidder with the highest bid and
has to pay the value of his or her bid1. In second price auc-
1In case of two or more bidders with the same highest bid
certain tie breaking rules apply.
tions, the winner is again the bidder with the highest bid,
but has to pay the value of the second highest bid. The
latter is in some ways more complicated than a first price
auction.2 So why is there interest in second price auctions?
Since it makes matters much easier for the bidders. Vick-
rey’s theorem states that in a second price auction a bidder
cannot do better than bidding what the object is actually
worth to her. If a bidder bid more than the object is worth
to her she would make a loss on winning. If she bid less than
the object is worth to her then potentially she does not real-
ize a potential gain. If, however, she bids exactly how much
she values the object all this cannot happen.
In addition to the distinctions between first price and sec-
ond price auctions, auctions come in single round auctions,
or auctions with several rounds (either ascending or descend-
ing). New auctions are still designed, e.g., recently for mo-
bile phone licenses in different countries.
According to one of the leading auctions designers [14,
p.152] “the two issues that really matter [in auction design]
are attracting entry and preventing collusion.” The first
issue is that if not sufficiently many agents attend an auction
then this is bad news for the seller. In the preface, Klemperer
mentions the case of “a German auction of three blocks of
spectrum [for which only three bidders had turned up and]
which therefore sold only at a tiny reserve price.” The second
issue is more interesting for the purpose of this paper (albeit
related to the first. If the bidders collude it only looks as
if there were many bidders, but actually all the colluding
bidders should count only as one). [14, p.152]: “Ascending
auctions allow bidders to use the early rounds to signal each
other how they might ‘collusively’ divide the spoils, and if
necessary, use later rounds to punish any rivals who fail to
cooperate.[. . .] By contrast, a (first-price) sealed-bid auction
provides no opportunity for either signalling or punishment
to support collusion.”
While it is not possible to send signals, it is still possible
to collude in such an auction as well, be it a first price or
second price auction.
Krishna [15, p.152] describes collusion in second price auc-
tions. Assume you have a number of agents and a bidding
ring (or cartel) among those. The cartel would determine
the one among them who values the object most and only
the high bidder would submit a serious bid, all the others
would either submit nothing or something that is so low that
there is no danger that it will bring the price up. The bidders
outside the cartel are not affected by this. ‘A bidding ring
generates profits for its members, of course, by suppressing
competition.’ In the extreme case all bidders are part of the
cartel and the object will be sold at the reserve price at the
expense of the seller, who without the existence of the cartel
would achieve a higher price.
A separate issue does occur in a scenario in which the
auctioneer cannot be trusted, for instance, since he is on
the side of one of the participants and abuses his privileged
position, e.g., to provide information to some participants
but not to others.
Vice versa within the insider threat community, the col-
lusion of insiders has been recognized as a main pattern of
insider threats. The CMU-CERT Insider Threat Guide [4]
names the Ambitious Leader pattern as one of the four main
2In case of combinatorial auctions when several goods are
auctioned at the same time, the determination of the winners
and the prices to pay may be computationally very complex.
patterns of insider threats. This pattern describes an out-
sider – the ambitious leader – that works together with (at
least) two insiders in separate infrastructures thereby real-
izing an attack that would not normally be possible for any
of the involved insiders on their own. This pattern is a col-
lusion of insiders. We used this pattern to show that the
Isabelle insider framework [12] is capable of expressing all
known insider threats.
3. COCAINE AUCTION PROTOCOL
In this section we will first summarize the cocaine protocol
as described in [25], then look at potential formalizations,
formalize the protocol, and discuss possible attacks.
3.1 Protocol
“Several extremely rich and ruthless men are gathered
around a table. An auction is about to be held in which
one of them will offer his next shipment of cocaine to the
highest bidder. The seller describes the merchandise and
proposes a starting price. The others then bid increasing
amounts until there are no bids for 30 consecutive seconds.
At that point, the seller declares the auction closed and ar-
ranges a secret appointment with the winner to deliver the
goods.” [25]. This is the short introduction to the cocaine
auction protocol given in the original paper. This example
serves as a model for eBay-like auctions where trust is an
issue. In the eBay model, the auction house could drive up
the sale price since it asks the bidders to reveal their max-
imum amount they are prepared to pay. The users simply
have to trust that eBay will not exploit that knowledge to
drive up the price (which would be profitable for the auction
house because it takes a commission which is a percentage
of the sales price). The eBay “peer review” system in which
users give each other reliability rating has proven to be a
quite successful method to guarantee trust between sellers
and buyers. However, trusting the auction house remains a
problem. The cocaine auction protocol has been designed
as an “exaggerated case that makes the trust issue unam-
biguous” [25]. There are several assumptions imposed on
the cocaine auction protocol in order to minimize trust.
• Nobody trusts anybody else more than is strictly nec-
essary.
• The people that take part in the auction all know each
other (otherwise one of them could be a police agent).
• No-one that makes a bid wants to be identified to the
other bidders nor to the seller.
• Nobody apart from the seller and the buyer should
know who won the auction; even the seller should only
find out the identity of the buyer when committing to
the sale, i.e., at the time of exchanging the goods at
the secret appointment.
• None of the participants should have to trust any of
the other participants; in particular there should not
be an independent judge or policeman. The protocol
must be self-enforcing.
3.2 Possible Implementations
For the context of this paper, we just assume an anony-
mous broadcast: a mechanism for broadcasting messages to
participants without revealing the identity of the sender.
This represents an anonymity layer that can be implemented
by cryptographic techniques, for example, using the dining
cryptographers algorithm [5], or by using physical broad-
cast short-range radio networking facility, e.g., Piconet. In
fact, the latter possibility is the main point of Stajano’s and
Ross’ paper [25] to advocate the use of physical broadcast
to implement the anonymity layer. For the context of this
paper, we abstract from the concrete implementation of this
anonymity layer. In the formal description of the protocol in
Section 4, we will instead rely on the inductive approach to
protocol verification and use address spoofing as a means for
the senders to hide their identity from the receivers. There
are two important details that we need to keep in mind when
considering the practical implementation of the protocol.
1. The seller needs a mechanism to identify the winner.
• A potential problem with this is that anyone can
come later and claim to have said“yes”(i.e., made
a bid) in the winning round.
• A solution to this is that such a “yes” message
(bid) contains a one-way function of a secret nonce.
• The seller will ask the winner to exhibit the orig-
inal nonce.
2. At finish of the auction, the seller prefers to give a
secret appointment to the winner.
• “See you on Tuesday at 06:30 in the car park
of Heathrow terminal 5” (rather than exchang-
ing suitcases of cocaine for cash under the noses
of all the losing bidders).
• On the other hand, the identity of the buyer should
not be revealed to the seller until the latter com-
mits to the sale (in order to protect the winner
from not getting the bid for other biases, e.g.,
since he is from the “wrong family”).
3.3 Protocol in Alice-Bob notation
Assuming an anonymity layer in a first approximation,
the protocol can be described as follows.
• Identity of the seller is known to buyers.
• Buyers’ messages are anonymous; seller’s are not; all
messages are broadcast.
• The protocol is a succession of rounds i of simple bid-
ding.
– The seller announces bid price bi of round i.
– Buyers have up to 30 seconds to say “yes”.
– As soon as a buyer says “yes”, he is winner of the
round, wi.
– A new round starts.
– If 30 seconds elapse in round i with no bid, winner
is wi−1.
The implementation of this protocol is given informally [25]
based on the use of the Diffie-Hellman key-establishment al-
gorithm [6]. For convenience, we briefly summarize the main
idea of the Diffie-Hellman key-establishment algorithm here.
This algorithm uses a prime number modulus p and a gen-
erator g ∈ Zp known to sender and receiver A and B. In
addition, A keeps a secret number a ∈ N and B a secret num-
ber b ∈ N. The algorithm works in two phases, establishing
the shared secret gabmod p between A and B without them
ever exchanging their secrets a and b in clear. In the first
phase, A calculates gamod p and sends it to B; B calculates
gbmod p and sends it to A. It is computationally infeasible
for large prime numbers p to get a or b from these because
of the Discrete-Logarithm-problem. In the second phase, A
calculates (gbmod p)amod p; B calculates (gamod p)bmod p.
Now, both have the shared secret because modular arith-
metic gives
(gbmod p)amod p = gbamod p = gabmod p = (gamod p)bmod p.
The security of the algorithm depends on the high complex-
ity of calculating gabmod p given g, p and the sent messages
gamod p and gbmod p. This problem is known as the Diffie-
Hellman-problem and seems intuitively related to the com-
putationally intractable Discrete-Logarithm-problem. The
Diffie-Hellman-problem has been proved to be equivalent
(for certain cases) to the Discrete-Logarithm-problem [20].
To formalize the protocol in the semi-formal “Alice-Bob”
notation we first give the assumptions.
• Generator g and module p are public auction parame-
ters.
• Anonymous “yes” message of winner wi is gxi .
• Seller uses his (random) secret y to send the secret
appointment to final winner wi encrypted with Diffie-
Hellman key gxiy.
• Possible variants for disambiguation and conciseness
are possible.
– Succession of bid prices bi is pre-specified (con-
ciseness).
– At beginning of round i, seller broadcasts the
“yes” message gxi−1 of winner of previous round
to arbitrate races.
– Bidders should include the bi in their “yes” mes-
sages.
Some extensions to the standard point-to-point messaging
that is common in Alice-Bob-notation are needed to express
the anonymous communication. Stajano and Ross introduce
a dedicated notation, which we adapt here for simplicity
slightly.
• D is the set of auction principals including the seller S
with secret y.
• ?Ai represents an anonymous principal in round i =
1, . . . , n− 1 with secret number xi.
• Winning round n− 1.
The cocaine auction protocol can then be specified using
Diffie-Hellman and the notations {a, b} for message concate-
nation and {m}K for encryption of message m with key K.
0. S → D: gy mod p
i. ?Ai → D: {gxi mod p, bi}
n. S→ D: {bi,MeetingAppointment}K , K = gxn−1ymod p
3.4 Insider/Collusion Attacks
Stajano and Anderson state “[t]here are limits what can
be achieved on the protocol level. It is always possible, [. . . ],
to subvert an auction when an appropriate combination of
participants colludes against others”. This collusion attack
is apparently known as“ringing”. The colluding bidders can,
for example, keep the price low and then share the profit.
It is a strong statement that this is always possible but the
statement is relative to the protocol level. In the formal
modelling and analysis of the auction protocol using the in-
ductive approach we will see that they are right. The chal-
lenge is to extend the usual protocol model with context
information so that it becomes feasible to express this kind
of collusion and consequently formalize and proof stronger
security properties.
The second attack on the cocaine auction protocol is the
so-called “sweetheart deal”: the collusion between the seller
and one of the bidders, i.e., “seller not selling to the highest
bidder” in [25, p. 4]. If this attack is attempted within
the limits of the protocol, i.e., the seller sends the secret
appointment not to wn−1, i.e., the winner of the winning
round n− 1, but instead to one of the earlier bidders wi for
i < n − 1, then the protocol in the above implementation
with Diffie-Hellman fails. That is, if S sends message n
encrypted with key gxiy mod p instead of gxn−1y, the real
winner wi will not be able to decrypt the message. This
failure of the protocol means that the attack is infeasible
if the protocol is implemented correctly. Formalizing the
protocol should enable proving that this is the case. We
will see how this can be formally proved even on our own
implementation with public keys in Section 4.
The attacks on the cocaine auction protocol involve bid-
ders and sellers. They are attacks on the auction that are
only possible because they exploit privileges, like knowledge
of keys, certificates, and access rights of roles, granted to
peers in the protocol. Therefore, they can be categorized as
insider attacks.
4. FORMAL MODEL
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a very efficient im-
plementation of this protocol. However, we aim at using
the established inductive approach to formally verify the
protocol. Unfortunately, the inductive approach uses an ab-
stract specification of symmetric or asymmetric keys and the
Diffie-Hellman keys do not fall in those categories. In fact,
the established Diffie-Hellman key gxiy mod p is a symmet-
ric key while the so-called ephemeral keys gy mod p and gxi
mod p are no encryption keys rather intermediate compu-
tations encrypting the secrets y and xi for public exchange.
Therefore, we provide here another possible implementation
of the cocaine auction protocol using standard public-key
cryptography.
The cocaine auction protocol can then be specified using
the public key KS of the seller S and its secret counterpart
K−1S for decryption and public encryption keys KAi of the
bidders with corresponding secret decryption keys K−1Ai .
0. S → D: KS
i. ?Ai → D: {KAi , bi}KS
n. S → D: {bn−1, MeetingAppointment}KAn−1
This asymmetric version of the protocol works as follows.
• In Step 0, the seller sends to all bidders in the set D
a public key KS enabling them to send secret message
to the seller.
• In each of the rounds i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 the bid-
der sends anonymously using the sender address ?Ai
his public key for the round KAi together with the
prearranged bid bi for the round encrypted with the
public key of the seller KS to the seller. The contents
of this message are only visible to the seller since only
he holds K−1S .
• In the final round (after the timeout has happened)
the seller S broadcasts to all bidders in D the highest
bid bn−1 and the secret message with the MeetingAp-
pointment. This broadcast message is encrypted with
the public key KAn−1 of the winner of round n − 1
that the seller could retrieve from the message in the
winning round n− 1.
In comparison to the version using Diffie-Hellman key-ex-
change, this second implementation of the cocaine auction
protocol seems slightly more complex. Although the latter
implementation abstracts from a concrete public-key algo-
rithm, Step i requires an encryption of the entire message
{KAi , bi}, whereas the Diffie-Hellman version requires only
the computation of one ephemeral key gxi mod p. For ex-
ample, if we consider RSA to be the concrete algorithm used
in the second public key version, the key length, i.e., the size
of the modules p would be roughly the same for RSA and
Diffie-Hellman for equal strength of security. At a closer
look, however, computing gxi mod p corresponds roughly to
the same computation effort as computing (#{KAi , bi})KAi
mod n (following the RSA-algorithm [24] where the # is the
transformation of the message into a number for exponenti-
ation with the RSA encryption key KAi modulo the public
modulus n = p ∗ q). The two implementations, or more pre-
cisely Steps i are of similar complexity, because, the ps and
qs are of similar size (currently 1024 bits are still considered
safe, although 2048 are recommended after the successful
factorization of a 1024 prime equivalent to breaking of 700
bit RSA key and the Logjam attack on Diffie-Hellman [2]).
4.1 Isabelle’s Inductive Approach to Security
Protocol Verification
The interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [21] imple-
ments classical higher order logic (HOL) for the modelling
of application logics. Inductive definitions and datatype def-
initions can be written in a way close to programming lan-
guages. Semantic properties over datatypes can be formal-
ized in a simple equation style by primitive recursion and
are strongly supported by automated proof procedures based
on rewriting, automated simplification, as well as externally
coupled dedicated provers.
The inductive approach to security protocol verification
by Paulson [23], the designer of the Isabelle system, picked
up on the hype generated by the earlier model checking ap-
proach to security by Lowe [16]. In comparison, the induc-
tive approach is more laborious as it requires human inter-
action, but it is unrivalled in its expressiveness which allows
proofs beyond the ones that are usually done in model check-
ers. Although proofs in Isabelle/HOL are not performed
automatically but have to be provided by the user, the in-
creased expressiveness allows modelling protocols less ab-
stractly than in a model checker. A protocol’s definition is
given as an inductive definition of the set of all “traces” that
are allowed by the protocol. A trace is a list of events repre-
senting the sending and receiving of messages that happen
in a possible run of the protocol. The inductive definition
defines all possible behaviours of a protocol as the minimal
set of traces described by the inductive rules corresponding
to the protocol’s communication steps.
Paulson’s inductive approach is only a starting point for
the modelling of insider threats to auction protocols. We see
in this paper, that the classical inductive approach needs to
be extended with concepts developed for the Isabelle insider
framework [12] in order to fully support reasoning about
insiders. Since an Isabelle framework, like the inductive ap-
proach to Security Protocol Verification, is nothing other
than a number of theory files containing a set of tailor-made
definitions and related theorems, it can be easily extended
and also integrated with other approaches like the Isabelle
insider framework [12].
For the sake of self-sufficiency, we briefly present the main
features of Isabelle’s inductive approach concentrating on
the parts we use.
4.1.1 Cryptography, Keys, and Messages
Security protocol specifications are constituted as sequences
of communication steps between principals possibly adding
abstract cryptographic functionality. For example, in the
so-called “Alice-Bob”-notation a typical protocol step like
A 7→ B : {M}K
would read as: “A sends to B message M encrypted by
key K”. The key could be specified more precisely as a
symmetric key or the private K−1A or public KA key of an
agent A.
The function invKey maps a public key to its matching
private key, and vice versa.
type synonym key = nat
consts invKey :: key ⇒ key
Nonces are a means to avoid replay attacks. A nonce is a
large random number. A message that requires a reply can
incorporate a nonce. The reply then must include that same
nonce to prove that it is not a replay of a past message.
Protocol messages can then be defined as a recursive data-
type msg building over the simple message constituents agents,
numbers, nonces, and keys. Protocol messages usually con-
sist of more than just one component. For the recursive
cases, a msg can be a combination of other messages or a
message encrypted with a key.
datatype msg = Agent agent
| Number nat
| Nonce nat
| Key key
| MPair msg msg
| Crypt key msg
Isabelle offers a sophisticated pretty printing syntax facility.
This allows us to define the notation {x1, . . . , xn−1, xn} for
the nested pairing MPair x1 . . . (MPair xn−1 xn) making the
specifications of protocols very close to the on-paper nota-
tion.
The way datatypes are implemented in Isabelle provides
the property that all of datatype constructors are injective
functions. Therefore, the above definition msg implicitly en-
tails the following theorem.
Crypt K M = Crypt K’ M’ =⇒ K = K’ ∧ M = M’
This theorem says that a message M encoded with a key K
yields only one ciphertext Crypt K M and no other message
M’ can be mapped onto this ciphertext – not even with a
different key. The model is an oversimplification: in reality
decryption with a wrong key K’ would actually yield a result
although quite likely pure rubbish. The oversimplification
is justified as in reality checksums are introduced on the
plaintext to exclude decryption with wrong keys.
4.1.2 Attacker Model, Events, and Traces
The principals are expressed by a datatype definition guar-
anteeing their distinctiveness. We assume a server, a number
of friendly principals, and a spy. That is, in our model the
attacker is explicitly modelled.
datatype agent = Server | Friend nat | Spy
The attacker can forge messages using all components he
can derive from previous traffic. The inductive operators
characterize the constituents of a protocol’s messages (set
parts), messages the attacker can extract from a protocol
trace (set analz), and messages that the attacker can build
(set synth).
Protocols are defined by inductive definitions describing
the behaviour of principals taking part in the protocol. Be-
haviours are sets of possible event traces. A trace is a list of
communication events, such as interleaved protocol runs.
Compared to the inductive definitions for synth and analz,
protocol definitions are thus of a different type: rather than
specifying a message set, they specify the behaviour of the
communicating principals as traces of events defined as a
datatype comprising different cases (represented as datatype
constructors) of protocol communication events. The main
case of an event is that an agent sends a message to an-
other agent: the constructor Says takes three arguments of
types agent, agent, and msg and returns one result of type
event. The other constructors of the datatype event are
Gets and Notes to specify the reception and storing of mes-
sages. Defining a protocol in the inductive definition consists
of defining a set of traces of events representing all possible
runs of the specified protocol. The attacker’s behaviour is
added by including Fake messages into traces. The analysis
first derives the knowledge he can extract from the protocol
(analz) and the messages he can synthesize (synth). This
characterizes the attacker’s behaviour and allows verification
of security properties. Following the Dolev-Yao model [7],
the Spy gets to know everything that is communicated along
any channel. To this end, the inductive approach models a
function spies that effectively deconstructs event traces into
sets of messages.
We omit this definition because we concentrate on insider
threats, i.e., we cannot assume to have a clear distinction
into “good” and “bad”. Our attacker could be any agent.
Besides insider threats, the cocaine auction protocol reveals
other requirements to the inductive approach that go beyond
classical security protocols.
1. In general, auctions necessitate an arbitrary number of
rounds;
2. we need to represent broadcast communication;
3. we need to enable anonymous sending of messages.
4.2 Cocaine Protocol in Isabelle
Our formalization of the cocaine auction protocol resides
in the theory file CocaineAuction.thy which is available
online [8]. We provide next the inductive definition before
we illustrate it by a simple example trace.
Formally, the inductive definition starts by introducing a
constant cocaine_auction.
inductive_set cocaine_auction :: event list set
Following this introduction of the inductive set constant, a
series of rules determines exactly which traces, i.e., lists of
events, are in the set defining the semantics of the protocol.
First, the rule Nil describes that the empty set is a possible
trace, representing the beginning of each protocol run.
Nil: [] ∈ cocaine_auction
Similar to the specification of other protocols, we specify
that Spy (see its specification in Message.thy [8]) can an-
alyze and synthesize from what he “spies”, i.e., the set of
things he knows (see also Event.thy [8]). Spy can then say
all these things since he is an agent as well. The symbol
=⇒ is the right associative implication of Isabelle’s meta
logic, i.e., the first two sub-formulas below have to be read
as a conjunction. The symbol # is the list constructor. Al-
together, the following rule reads as “if a trace evsf is a
(possible behaviour of a) cocaine auction and X is a message
that can be synthesized from what can be analyzed from all
the events in the trace that the spy can see, then a possible
continuation is the sequence evsf extended by the event in
which the spy utters to any principal RR this message X”.
Fake: evsf ∈ cocaine_auction
=⇒ X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))
=⇒ Says Spy RR X # evsf ∈ cocaine_auction
Initially at the beginning of every cocaine auction, the Server
(equal seller) sends his public key out to all agents that are
present (all Friends). This definition uses list comprehen-
sion to produce a list of Says events for all i < friends
setting it as the beginning of any run of the cocaine auction.
CA0: [Says Server (Friend i) (Key(pubK Server)).
i ← [0..<friends]] ∈ cocaine_auction
In each round i, a Friend (bidder) can make an offer by say-
ing “yes” corresponding to broadcasting a public encryption
key encrypted with the Server key. Together with this pub-
lic encryption key the bidder sends also the current price of
that round (bid i) assumed to be given in advance by the
function bid applied here to the round number i. We use
the Isabelle specification device that allows to define an
abstract function bid specifying that it should be injective,
strongly monotonically increasing, and bid(0) = 0. A wit-
ness has to be given and the properties must be proved for
a specification to be accepted by Isabelle. Authentication
of the bidder is omitted here since later the bidder authen-
ticates himself at the meeting point which he would not
have been able to find without decrypting the message of
the Server (see below – the final message of the Server is en-
crypted with the public key of the bidder transmitted here)).
The bidder uses the sender address Friend(friends) which
is the “anonymous” address. I.e., the bidders use “spoof-
ing” to anonymize their messages. The public key they send
is here formalized as pubK(Friend j) (see the theory file
Public.thy [8]) but the owner of the key Friend j is as-
sumed to be not visible – not even to the intended receiver
of this broadcast message (the Server). The precondition on
hd(evs) ensures that either
• this is the first round indicated by the last message
(first in event list) being one of the initial messages of
the Server with his pubK, or
• the previous event has been a message in which a bid-
der different from Friend j has made a bid and won
the round. This is indicated in the last message be-
ing a bid similar to the current one but from Friend
k with the previous bid(i - 1). Friend j now can
increase the price to bid i.
CAi: evs ∈ cocaine_auction =⇒ j < friends =⇒
hd(evs) = Says Server (Friend l)(Key(pubK Server))
∧ i = 1 ∨
hd(evs) = Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend k)), Number(bid (i-1))})
∧ i > 1
=⇒ (Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)}))
# [Says (Friend friends) (Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)})).
i ← [0..<friends]]
@ evs ∈ cocaine_auction
Timeout can take place at any time. We simply do not
model time in the protocol and it is not necessary. Since we
keep all possible traces as the semantics of a protocol in the
inductive approach, any occurrence of timeouts is modelled.
For the next rule of the auction protocol, we assume that
timeout has just happened. Now, in this final round, the
Server sends out the message with the secret appointment
(encoded as a natural number for simplicity) and signs it
with the public key of “some friend”. This is the bidder that
has won the previous round n-1. In this refined version, we
enforce this by the precondition on hd(evs). The winner of
the previous round is represented in this most recent message
by its public encryption key pubK (Friend j). For the final
message, this key of Friend j is chosen and the message
with the secret appointment mtng3 is sent encrypted with
this public encryption key pubK of Friend j so that only he
can decrypt it.
CAn: evs ∈ cocaine_auction =⇒
evs = Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)})
# [Says (Friend friends)(Friend k)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)}.
k ← [0..<friends]] @ evsf
=⇒ [Says Server (Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK(Friend j))
{Number(bid i), Number mtng}.
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evs ∈ cocaine_auction
This specification of the cocaine auction protocol establishes
a few particular solutions extending the inductive approach
to represent the peculiar requirements of the application (see
previous section).
3The message is for simplicity embedded into the given mes-
sage type msg provided in the inductive approach. It may
be thought of as “encoded” as a number.
1. Arbitrary numbers of rounds in an auction are enabled
and yet inconsistent traces are excluded since the rule
CAi can be chained up any number of times but us-
ing a natural number counter i their interleaving can
be controlled. The use of i and i-1 is based on the
mathematical library of Isabelle showing yet again the
advantage of using this expressive, complete and con-
sistent approach.
2. Broadcast communication is modelled explicitly using
lists of messages to all principals. Again we see here
the use of Isabelle libraries – this time for lists using the
list comprehension in Haskell-like syntax: the formal-
ization of a broadcast of a message m from a principal
A to a community of principals D is [Says A (Friend
j) m. j ←[0 ..<friends]. This is simple and con-
cise and corresponds quite closely to the specification
using Alice-Bob notation as specified in the original
paper [25] (also see Section 3.3).
3. Anonymous sending is implemented in our above pro-
tocol specification by spoofing. This term corresponds
to a classical vulnerability of the TCP/IP protocol
whereby the sender field in IP-packets can be freely
replaced by an attacker to impersonate a principal.
In order to hide his real identity, here in our induc-
tive definition, the legitimate sender inserts (spoofs)
the sender Friend friends in rule CAi using an iden-
tity that is out of bounds (only addresses strictly less
than friends are admitted for Friends).
Although we stated above that we “abstract from a concrete
implementation of the anonymity layer” the implementation
by spoofing discussed in Point 3 comes very close to a tech-
nical solution of an anonymity layer. However, it does im-
plicitly use the context assumptions of Paulson’s inductive
approach, here specifically, that keys remain unbroken, and
that no attacker has a complete view of the network, but
also others that the attacker can intercept, eavesdrop, and
insert fabricated messages. These assumptions are common
as global assumption for security protocol verification. They
are mainly due to the Dolev-Yao model but are also inspired
by common properties of the Internet protocol TCP/IP, like
the spoofing property used. Clearly, in the context of in-
sider threats we would need a slightly more global view as
we consider not only the networking layer but also higher
layers of infrastructures, like physical architectures, orga-
nizational policies, and even socio-technical system aspects
[12].
4.2.1 Simple Example Trace
In order to illustrate the inductive definition of the co-
caine auction protocol we consider here a simple example.
Assume there are only 2 bidders, i.e., friends = 2. The
following subset of traces of cocaine_auction step-by-step
grows traces representing an auction in which each bidder
makes just one offer before timeout appears after Friend 1
bids finishing the auction. In the following set lists are post-
fixes of their successors, i.e., the traces repeat the previous
trace. To make the exposition more succinct, we put “...” as
much as possible omitting repetitions but their last element
and highlighting the common parts by equal colours. There
are precisely two rounds. We omit in particular all traces
interleaved by Fake events.
{
[],
[ Says Server (Friend 0)(Key(pubK Server)),
Says Server (Friend 1)(Key(pubK Server))
],
[ Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 0)), Number(bid 1)}),
Says (Friend friends) (Friend 0)
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 0)), Number(bid 1)}),
Says (Friend friends) (Friend 1)
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 0)), Number(bid 1)}),
Says Server (Friend 0)(Key(pubK Server)),
Says Server (Friend 1)(Key(pubK Server))
],
[ Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 1)), Number(bid 2)}),
Says (Friend friends) (Friend 0)
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 1)), Number(bid 2)}),
Says (Friend friends) (Friend 1)
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 1)), Number(bid 2)}),
Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt(pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 0)), Number(bid 1)}),
...
],
[ Says Server (Friend 0)
(Crypt(pubK(Friend 1))
{(Number(bid 2)), Number 42)},
Says Server (Friend 1)
(Crypt(pubK(Friend 1))
{(Number(bid 2)), Number 42)},
Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend 1)), Number(bid 2)}),
...
]
}
Clearly this is just an illustrative small example given by
a selected subset of traces following the provided induc-
tive rules in the given order CA0, CAi, CAn. The message
that the Server sends in the final step encoding the meet-
ing appointment as a number is randomly chosen to be 42;
uniquely encoding a real appointment message like“meet me
at 6.30am in the car park of Heathrow Terminal 5” would
result in a much larger number.
4.3 Specification and Proof of Insider Threats
The insider attacks on auctions we investigate on the run-
ning example of the cocaine auction protocol are the sweet-
heart deal and the collusion of bidders known as “ringing”
because they build a bidding ring or cartel (see Section 2).
4.3.1 Sweetheart Deal
Our hypothesis is that the formal specification of a se-
curity protocol is sufficient to exclude the sweetheart deal.
That is, the way we defined the rules for the cocaine auction
should forbid that the seller announces the wrong bidder as
the winner (his “sweetheart” – someone he has made a deal
with outside the auction).
As a first observation, this attack is clearly an insider at-
tack, as it it only possible because an insider – here the seller
– colludes with another insider – a bidder. Together they
use their privileges given by the policy – here, the auction –
to achieve the attack goal – here, winning the auction.
The second observation is that the two final steps of the
protocol – the way we defined it – prohibit that this insider
threat may occur. In our formal specification, the second to
last step of any protocol run (not counting interspersed Spy
actions) is an application of CAi (see also the example given
in the previous section to illustrate that point). The second
to last message is a broadcast message of the bidder Friend
j to the Server and all other bidders using the anonymous
sender address Friend friends but containing an own pub-
lic key pubK(Friend j) encrypted with the Server’s pub-
lic key. A list of events corresponding to this broadcast
message must be starting the trace if the last rule CAn is
invoked. When applying the rule, the last broadcast mes-
sages thus automatically use the key (Crypt (pubK(Friend
j)) for the encryption of the meeting appointment for that
same Friend j as specified in the precondition. Therefore,
no other Friend k for j 6= k can be chosen by the Server.
Informally, this argument seems clear. But how can we
prove this formally? The first step is the statement of the
property which just formalizes the above observation. If any
cocaine auction ends with a broadcast by the Server that the
bidder Friend j is the winner, then the trace evs prior to
this must have been a broadcast of this bidder. The addi-
tional assumption 0 < friends in the theorem just excludes
the empty set of bidders and generalizes the property for any
finite number of bidders.
theorem no_sweetheart_deal:
0 < friends =⇒
[Says Server (Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK (Friend j))
{Number(bid i), Number mtng}.
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evs ∈ cocaine_auction
=⇒ ∃ evsf. evs =
Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)})
# [Says Server (Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)}).
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evsf
Isabelle is an interactive theorem prover, i.e., statements of
theorems, like the above, need to be proved. This proof is
supported by the fact that the rules for defining the protocol
are an inductive definition. In Isabelle, and also in general,
inductive definitions define the least set that is closed by
a given set of rules. The principle of rule inversion allows
us for a given element in this set to make a case analysis
according to the cases defined by the rules of the inductive
definition. In our case, the elements of the inductive set
are traces, i.e., lists of events. Applying rule inversion tech-
nically in Isabelle is provided by the command inductive
cases which provides us with a case analysis rule that re-
duces a property statement about trace sets of cocaine auc-
tions, like the theorem no_sweetheart_deal to 6 subgoals
corresponding to the premises of each of the rules of the
inductive definition.
For the proof of the theorem, luckily, the first empty case
is trivially true, while 4 other cases can be easily excluded.
In Isabelle, elements of a datatype, here the datatypes of
events, message, and agents, are distinct if their arguments
or constructors differ. Thus, two traces starting say with
Says Server X y and Says (Friend j) Z U can never be
equal because the arguments Server and Friend j are dis-
tinct therefore the application of constructor Says renders
distinct elements. Consequently, the only real case that re-
mains to be shown is the one that actually corresponds to
the precondition of the theorem.
∃ evsf. evs =
Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key (pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid i)})
# [Says (Friend friends)(Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j),Number(bid i)})).
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evsf
This case can be easily solved by instantiating the existential
quantifier and applying simplification.
4.3.2 Intermediate Analysis
An important observation from the previous attack is that
the main attack analysis device of the inductive approach –
the Dolev-Yao attacker Spy and the related infrastructure –
play almost no role in it: possible injections of Spy-events
into successful, i.e., finishing, traces of the cocaine protocol
are merely those where the Spy feeds messages after Step 0
of the cocaine protocol. Even though Spy is able to play in
Fake messages at any point of a partially finished trace this
will lead to this trace ending unsuccessfully without reaching
the goal of the auction. In the formal model, this is due to
the fact that all latter steps require as a precondition that
the previous message was one either originating from the
Server or one from one of the Friends j for j < friends.
Now, since Spy, Server, and Friend j are elements of the
datatype agent that are created by different constructors,
they are pairwise distinct. In particular, Spy cannot match
either Server or Friend j for any j and the preconditions
for any of the rules, CAi or CAn cannot become true any more
once Spy has interspersed a trace by sending a fake message.
This limitation of the inductive approach is not surpris-
ing since modelling the agents as constructors of a datatype
feeds into the global view (already discussed above) that
agents are firmly divided into “bad” and “good”.
Surprisingly, this does not impede the analysis of the sweet-
heart deal. On the contrary, for an analysis of insider threats
in general, the fixed distinction of attackers and“good”prin-
cipals is generally an inadequate modelling decision. As
already observed in earlier papers on the formal analysis
of insider threats [11], one of the major tricks to find at-
tacks on security protocols is to consider insiders: the clas-
sic attack on the Needham-Schroeder attack is performed by
the insider Eve4. This man-in-the-middle attack (or mirror-
attack) uses impersonation which has motivated the Isabelle
insider approach of using sociological model inspired by Max
Weber supported with Hempel and Oppenheim’s logic of ex-
planation to model and analyze insider threats in Isabelle
with logic and proof.
Therefore, at this point we extend the inductive approach
with the Isabelle insider framework that has been especially
4Eve uses her own legal credentials (a public key) to get
Alice’s nonce sent to Eve when Alice wants to communicate
with her. This nonce is used as an authentication token to
Bob. Eve next uses the first protocol run with Alice as an
oracle to decrypt Bob’s Nonce sent back to Eve encrypted
with Alice’s public key to challenge her presumed identity.
designed for the purpose. We only introduce the minimally
necessary parts of that framework in order to illustrate how
it can be used to model ringing. For more detail, the in-
terested reader is referred to the main paper [12] and ap-
plication examples to IoT insider threats [10] and insider
threats to Airplane safety and security [9]. The follow-
ing section recapitulates the parts of the Isabelle insider
framework that are used to extend the inductive approach
because they are needed to express collusion (see theorem
Insider_homo_oeconomicus below).
4.3.3 Isabelle Insider Framework
The Isabelle insider framework uses a taxonomy of insider
threats [22]. This taxonomy is based on a thorough sur-
vey on results from counterproductive workplace behaviour,
e.g., [19, 17] and case studies from the CMU-CERT Insider
Threat Guide [4]. The insider framework simply models
the taxonomy in HOL as datatypes, a concept of HOL that
resembles the concept of taxonomy classes. As an example,
consider the formal representation of Psychological State [22]
as a datatype.
datatype psy_states = happy | depressed | disgruntled
| angry | stressed
The element on the right hand side are the five injective
constructors of the new datatype psy_states. They are
simple constants, modelled as functions without arguments.
Another example is Motivation [22].
datatype motivations = financial | political | revenge
| fun | competitive_advantage
| power | peer_recognition
In the Isabelle insider framework, we combine the charac-
teristics about the actor in a combined state.
datatype actor_state = State motivation psy_state
The Precipitating Event or Catalyst can be any event that
has the potential to tip the insider over the edge into be-
coming a threat to their employer. It has been called the
‘tipping point’ in the literature. This catalyst is encoded as
a tipping point predicate describing the psychological state
and motivation of an actor to become an insider.
definition tipping_point :: actor_state ⇒ bool
tipping_point a ≡ motivation a 6= {}
∧ happy 6= psy_states a
Insider threat case studies show that a recurring scheme in
insider attacks lies in role identification as described in [11].
The Isabelle insider framework uses this role identification
in the definition of the UasI predicate. It expresses that
the insider plays a loyal member of an organization while he
simultaneously acts as an attacker. Note, that in order to
integrate the Isabelle insider framework with the inductive
approach, we use the agent constructor Friend here.
UasI a b ≡ (Friend a = Friend b)
Insider attacks link the insider characterization of psycho-
logical disposition with the above insider behaviour UasI.
This is defined by the following rule Insider a C for the at-
tacker a. The parameter C is a set of identities representing
the members of an organization that are to be considered as
safe.
Insider a C ≡
tipping_point (astate a) −→ (∀ b ∈ C. UasI a b)
Although the above insider predicate is a rule, it is not ax-
iomatized. It is just an Isabelle definition i.e., it serves as
an abbreviation. To use it in an application, like the auc-
tion protocol, we can use this rule as a local assumption in
theorems (see below theorem Insider_homo_oeconomicus)
or using the assumes feature of locales [13]).
4.3.4 Homo Oeconomicus and Ringing Attack
The principle of homo oeconomicus defines agents to be
rational. In general, this economic principle captures the
idea that any agent a will not spend more than necessary to
get an asset, i.e., if a can get the asset for price X, he will
not pay price Y > X to get it.
Without explicitly introducing the additional concept of
“price” and buying assets, we can simply formalize the prin-
ciple homo_oeconomicus for the context of the cocaine proto-
col, by stating that an agent that is currently the winner of
round i will not make another bid in the next round. Tech-
nically, as a general property this states that for all traces
t representing (intermediate) runs of the cocaine protocol
no bidder will make a bid in the current round, if he is the
highest bidder in the trace leading up to the current round.
This is represented by the function CAtl applied to cocaine
auction trace t. We define this function CAtl as a primitive
recursive function that cuts off from any trace t all lead-
ing events if these exist at the front of t corresponding to
(a) the Server’s final broadcast according to rule CAn, (b)
the last bid, i.e., the anonymous broadcast by some Friend
j according to rule CAi, (c) all initial Server messages ac-
cording to rule CA0 leaving the empty trace. Excluding that
the currently highest bidder will make the next bid, corre-
sponds to saying that the head of any trail t cannot be an
event in which this bidder broadcasts his “yes”. We can sim-
ply use the Isabelle list function hd since literally the first
element of that list of “yes” broadcast events correspond-
ing to rule CAi is the message to the Server. The auxiliary
functions highest_bidder and cur_round are also defined
as primitive recursive functions over traces in Isabelle in the
intuitive way (for details see the Isabelle files [8]).
homo_oeconomicus ≡
∀ t ∈ cocaine_auction. ∀ j < friends.
highest_bidder (CAtl t) (Friend j) −→
hd t 6= Says (Friend friends) Server
(Crypt (pubK Server)
{Key(pubK(Friend j)), Number(bid(cur_round t))})
As a first illustration for the use of this definition, we can
use it to show that if there is only one bidder, the seller will
only get the reserve price bid 1.
theorem homo_economicus_one_bidder:
friends = 1 =⇒ homo_oeconomicus
=⇒
∀ t ∈ cocaine_auction.
t = [Says Server (Friend k)
(Crypt(pubK(Friend j)){Number(bid i), Number msg}).
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evs
−→ i = 1
The above property is a useful stepping stone on the way
to proving that if there is a collusion amongst all bidders, the
Server will only get the reserve price. We cannot prove that
a collusion between players glues them together to become
physically one Friend corresponding to showing that the
constant friends must be equal to 1. However, we can
prove that the same conclusion as in the previous theorem
follows as well. We assume that one bidder, Friend 0 is an
insider and at the tipping point, and all bidders act as one
agent, i.e., the insider can impersonate them. From that we
show the same conclusion as in the previous theorem follows:
the seller only gets the reserve price.
theorem Insider_homo_oeconomicus:
homo_oeconomicus =⇒ tipping_point(astate 0)
=⇒ Insider 0 {i. i < friends} =⇒
∀ t ∈ cocaine_auction.
t = [Says Server (Friend k)
(Crypt (pubK(Friend j))
{Number(bid i), Number msg}).
k ← [0..<friends]]
@ evs
−→ i = 1
In the proof of this theorem, the insider assumption is used
to show that the prerequisite highest_bidder (CAtl t)
(Friend j) of the hypothesis homo_oeconomicus can be made
true for any bidder as soon as one of them, here Friend 0,
is the highest bidder, because he can impersonate anyone.
Invoking the assumption homo_oeconomicus, we can then
prove that any continuation of the trace containing a first
bid cannot continue, since it would be a bid of the same bid-
der contradicting the principle. So all traces end with the
highest bid bid 1 which corresponds intuitively to a“reserve
price” (bid 0 is specified to be 0, see Section 4.2).
We have thus formally shown that the insider assumption
in fact enforces that the cocaine protocol can generally be
corrupted by the collusion of all bidders.
5. USEFULNESS AND LIMITATIONS
In the protocol we make several assumptions. We share
the view of the authors of the original paper [25] “We do
not believe that all such attacks can be detected, let alone
stopped, by any particular auction protocol”.
One problem is inherent in the set-up of the auction. In
order to avoid that the other participants see who has made
a bid at a particular time, the authors of [25] discuss that
the participants have a clicker in their pockets and can press
them without the others noticing. Then there are some
problems with this, since once a bid has been made another
press of a button would mean to bid for the next higher
price. For example, assume that in each step the price goes
up by 1000 and that the current high bid is at 49,000. As-
sume furthermore that both bidder b1 and b2 are willing to
bid up to (inclusively) 50,000. They both decide to press,
but b1 is a split second faster and makes the bid for 50,000.
The click by b2 is still registered but would count as 51,000,
an amount b2 would not want to pay. Practically it would
make sense that after a click any further clicks are disabled
by a fixed amount of time (e.g., 10 seconds) and the amount
of the current high bid is announced (e.g., on a display). In
this scenario b1’s bid would initially disable the bidding pro-
cess and after the display of 50,000 b2 would have to press
again before a further bid is registered. We assume that this
process cannot be manipulated, since otherwise the auction-
eer could always broadcast the acknowledgement of the bid
with his sweetheart’s key and all other bidders assume that
they had been too slow to win the round, although actually
one of them should have won the round and the sweetheart
did actually not bid. The participants could not detect the
manipulations since the actually generated trace is a legal
trace of the protocol.
The proof guarantees only that the key used by the winner
of the penultimate round – after the 30 seconds have lapsed
without a bid – is used for the broadcast with the secret
location, so that only the winner can decrypt the location.
If, however, the true winner did not know that he had won
the penultimate round, he would not expect to be sent the
location and would not be in the position to detect foul play.
It is not surprising that without any assumptions only
very little can be said about possible traces. In this case, it
can be said that it can be detected if different keys are used
in the penultimate and in the ultimate rounds. Obviously,
the protocol cannot rule out that the seller sends a wrong
MeetingAppointment to the true winner and uses commu-
nication channels outside the protocol to communicate the
true MeetingAppointment to his sweetheart.
In summary, our model abstracts from some implementa-
tion details and inherently assumes the following.
• The implementation of the auction needs to provide a
mechanism to avoid racing conditions and give unam-
biguous feedback to the successful bidder, e.g. some
notice board and time delays between bids.
• The veracity of the meeting point is assumed and the
post-procedure of the cocaine-money exchange is be-
yond the protocol model.
In fact, the part of the Isabelle insider framework that has
not been used here provides the possibility to express in-
frastructure in which agents act and could thus be used to
address the second point. However, that would be beyond
the limits of this paper.
An interesting question is, how in the inductive approach,
the attack on the Needham-Schroeder asymmetric protocol
(NS-protocol) has been modelled. This man-in-the-middle
attack can be considered as the first insider attack [11]. How-
ever, in the inductive approach the attacker is always only
the agent Spy, and Spy is different to all other agents by con-
struction. So, how could the NS-protocol be modelled when
the attacker is Friend i for some i in n? The answer is that
the protocol definition deliberately allows any agent in the
rules for the inductive definition. In the rules of the defi-
nition of the NS-protocol in the inductive approach, letters
A and B are used to suggest agents Alice and Bob. Con-
sider, for example the crucial rule NS1 from the NS-protocol
formalization in the inductive approach where the initiator
sends a nonce to the intended recipient.
NS1: evs1 ∈ ns_public =⇒ Nonce NA /∈ used evs1 =⇒
Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) { Nonce NA, Agent A})
# evs1 ∈ ns_public
The important point for the NS-protocol attack to work is
that this intended recipient can be an attacker. I.e., a legal
participant of the network of peers is malicious and abuses
a connection request by the initiator to impersonate this
initiator. Although in the above rule, the capital letters A
and B seem to indicate that these are the agents Alice and
Bob, they are variables fixed only in the context of the rule.
When the rule is applied they can be freely instantiated to
any agent, also to Spy.
Summarizing, the inductive approach allows for different
“kinds” of specification of a protocol: one where the actors
are explicitly made distinct using different constructors of
datatype agent in the specification (this is how we used it
for the cocaine auction protocol) and one where agents are
all abstract within the protocol (either as Higher Order vari-
ables as in the NS-application above or all represented as
Friend j.) If we were to redefine the cocaine auction proto-
col in the latter way with abstract actors for all roles, then
we would replace the seller also by Friend k. In this case,
we would not be able to exclude the sweetheart deal: if we
assume that the Server, say Friend 0, is an insider and at
tipping point, he can impersonate a bidder and can then
make his own bids using another role, say Friend j. This
would enable the Server to provide a suitable bid for his
sweetheart. In addition, it would enable another attack in
which the Server, acting like a bidder, just drives the price
up.
The formalization and proofs presented in this paper pro-
vide in summary the following results.
• Formal model of the cocaine auction protocol using the
inductive approach proving the absence of sweetheart
deals and the impossibility to exclude collusion.
• Formalization of arbitrary numbers of rounds, broad-
cast, and anonymous message sending for the inductive
approach.
• The inductive approach can only deal with Insider
threats by abstracting from its agent datatype that
prevents good agents from behaving badly.
• Integrating (parts of) the Isabelle insider framework
with the inductive approach enables reasoning about
collusion of insiders for auctions.
• The collusion exhibits that the assumption homo oe-
conomicus suffices to prove that rational insiders may
use collusion to force the reserve price.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the vulnerability of
auctions to insider attacks in particular different forms of
collusion. We used the cocaine auction protocol as a case
study that takes mistrust to an extreme. Using modelling
and analysis in Isabelle we experimented with two different
approaches, the inductive approach to security protocols and
the Isabelle insider framework. We were able to model the
protocol in the inductive approach and show that its formal
specification excludes a possible insider attack, the “sweet-
heart deal”. Integrating the inductive approach with the
Isabelle insider framework enabled showing that collusion
between all bidders, so-called “ringing”, cannot be excluded.
In order to prove the latter theorem, we formalized a notion
of “homo-oeconomicus” for the cocaine auction protocol.
While some of the issues around broadcasting have been
addressed in more recent extensions of the inductive ap-
proach [18] for group protocols, we provide our own solutions
tailored to the specific needs of insider threats.
Limitations of our model are discussed in the previous
section showing that – despite the formality introduced and
frameworks used – all guarantees depend on the abstraction
we chose when modelling. Any formalization and proof of
system properties depends always on the model we consider.
This is also true for the system abstractions of protocols
and auctions. Therefore, the implicit assumptions about
real world participants are crucial. The use of the insider
framework makes role impersonation explicit in models and
therefore helps to understand in more detail how insider at-
tacks work in auctions. The additional assumption homo
oeconomicus could be a beneficial extension to enrich the
Isabelle insider framework by a notion of a rational insider
although its general assumption as part of an Insider defini-
tion is disputable.
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